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This thesis uses systems engineering techniques to assess the feasibility for the 
United States Army to use IPv6 securely over an IEEE standard 802.15.4 (6LoWPAN) 
network in both an operational and a support role. The methods used include assessing 
the limitations and security mechanisms of 6LoWPAN, assessing wireless security 
concerns, small battery capacity and duration, and the remaining potential for use in both 
environments. The same model could apply to other protocols or capabilities given 
operational requirements. Expected operational situations aid in identification of 
requirements. The two operational scenarios examined in this thesis indicate 6LoWPAN 
could provide value and meet technical requirements in a support environment such as a 
combat hospital, but analysis of a tactical situation such as replacing an AN/PRC-154A 
radio for Nett Warrior backhaul indicates its implementation would be problematic. 
Specifically, in the generalized tactical role, 6LoWPAN devices with a standard AAA 
rechargeable battery exhibit a lifetime of 11.7 hours or 15.3 hours with a standard AA 
rechargeable battery and 2.45-inch device length transmitting at -2 dBm. The required 
encryption standards and layered protocol stack headers result in message payload limits, 
the worst-case being 45 bytes of data. Reliable voice communications are not feasible 
over 6LoWPAN’s limited bandwidth.  
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This thesis uses systems engineering techniques to assess the feasibility of the 
United States (U.S.) Army securely using IPv6 over an IEEE standard 802.15.4 
(6LoWPAN) network. The Internet of Things (IoT) offers connectivity to previously 
isolated devices needing to pass only small amounts of information. Current trends to 
maximize transmission speeds and data throughput pay little concern to energy. This 
thesis presents a model that assesses 6LoWPAN in both a potential operational role as a 
Blue Force Tracker (BFT) backhaul and a potential support role as connecting a combat 
support hospital (CSH) as a smart building. Examination of the two scenarios indicate 
6LoWPAN could provide value and meet technical requirements in a support 
environment, but analysis of a tactical situation such as replacing a AN/PRC-154A radio 
for BFT backhaul within the Nett Warrior system indicates its implementation would be 
problematic. Specifically, in the tactical role, 6LoWPAN devices with one standard AA 
rechargeable NiMH AA battery, a small dipole antenna only 0.45 inches longer than the 
battery, and processing capability draining power at 5 nJ/bit send team member position 
updates every 10 seconds at spacing intervals up to 300 meters apart to the team leader. 
Under this specific requirement, each team member device lasts over 15.3 hours. The 
limitation of battery device size and NSA type I encryption standards result in messages 
limited to 45 bytes of data. The range limitations of 6LoWPAN and narrow messaging 
capability get exchanged for extremely low SWAP amounts. 
The thesis initially examines the IoT as well as the genesis of the study and 
background. The Army user community, as any entity, arguably gravitates toward high 
bandwidth, high-powered devices to accomplish tasks in an increasingly complex 
network environment. In contrast, the Soldier on the battlefield prefers the lightest weight 
solution meeting the requirements. The IoT concept embraces network connectivity of 
every day, isolated electronic objects for two-way data communications using extremely 
low power with the intent of extending duration. This thesis first analyzes feasibility 
leveraging the benefits of IPv6 functionality over a lower size, weight, and power 
(SWAP) solution to still meet current user requirements.   
 xvi
This thesis then explores the capabilities and options available by using 
6LoWPAN. Decrements made at each protocol stack layer translate to headers required 
to achieve user requirements and remaining payload space. Standards for each protocol 
stack layer define required header contents and allow a capability assessment of each 
option.  Each selected option determines remaining packet size in octets that defines 
application layer payload minimum and maximum limits. First, the physical layer offers 
topology options and node identification protocols. The data link layer offers security 
alternatives of 6LoWPAN. Each option yields varying message security levels to meet 
U.S. Army requirements. The network layer determines routing protocols in lieu of a full 
40-byte IPv6 header that would diminish remaining payload space. The transport layer 
determines how the messages move through the network and whether or not two-way 
communications require receipt acknowledgments. Finally, any remaining payload can 
carry data traffic. The most streamlined scenario leaves 87 octets for application layer use 
while even the most robust leaves 45 octets for application layer use. 
Systems engineering approaches develop user requirements for an operational 
BFT scenario and a less volatile equipment-tracking scenario in an Army CSH. User 
requirements for throughput, frequency of position update, maximization of device 
duration, and minimization of device size define feasibility space of an assessment or 
design space for development. Subsequently, each user requirement gets measured 
against 6LoWPAN capabilities and constraints. Various device sizes and associated 
dipole antenna lengths, throughput constraints, multiple transmission powers, specified 
receiver sensitivity, encryption, and resiliency all translate into measures of success.  
A holistic view of the set of measures determines 6LoWPAN’s feasibility for secure 
Army use. 
As a result, the Army and other services should investigate use of 6LoWPAN in 
environments with limited energy and low throughput requirements. Specific areas for 
future research and application of the study to similar areas for analysis include defining 
logical interfaces with existing or necessary capability, measuring sufficiency of 
performance from a user perspective, material enhancements to increase SWAP savings, 




The Internet of Things (IoT) embraces network connectivity of everyday, non-
computer objects for two-way data communications. The IoT concept offers potential to 
extend connectivity to devices and mobile nodes at the tactical edge of the battlefield at 
low cost. Size, weight, and power (SWAP) provide strong metrics for measuring 
consumer cost. The individual Soldier positioned at the last tactical mile places a 
premium on minimizing SWAP. Likewise, asset location tools enable leaders to assess 
quickly and reallocate personnel and resources to the right place and time. Internet 
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) over a low-power wireless personal area network (LoWPAN), 
defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) as 802.15.4, is 
often referred to as 6LoWPAN. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard specifies physical layer and 
media access control layer (MAC) for LoWPANs, focusing on low-cost, low-speed, and 
low-power communication. IPv6 adds the upper layer protocols enabling the network and 
transport protocols. 6LoWPAN commonly encapsulates the combination of IPv6 over an 
802.15.4 network. Shadowed by ever-increasing bandwidth and range capable devices, 
this often-overlooked protocol offers a relatively small SWAP footprint position location 
capability to the United States Army.  
The leaders of today’s Soldiers risk sensory overload from informational displays 
while simultaneously deciphering friend or foe in an often-asymmetric environment. The 
information presented to the Soldiers may require fusion or processing before becoming 
actionable, or even useful, intelligence. One tool requiring little to no individual 
processing, quickly locating friendly forces on the battlefield, is blue-force tracking 
(BFT). While maintaining locational awareness of friendly forces in a dismounted 
operation often occurs through line of sight (LOS) or verbal passing of information 
within a small fire-team or squad sub-section, supporting elements or higher echelons 
may be left only approximating individual Soldier locations. The U.S. Army’s 
dismounted BFT system, Nett Warrior, named after WWII Medal of Honor recipient, 
Colonel Robert B. Nett, allows users to see their own location, location of other users, 
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and locations of the enemy on a moving map (Lopez 2010). The Nett Warrior system 
being fielded today currently offers the location of the system users (Dawson 2015). 
Additionally, current initiatives aim to reduce the weight burden, often surpassing 
100 pounds, on Soldiers while maintaining or enhancing current operating capabilities 
(Friedl and Santee 2011). Using 6LoWPAN is a potential solution to increasing 
awareness of individual Soldier positions while incurring negligible weight increase to 
the Soldier’s payload. 
IEEE 802.15.4 networks operate on different frequency ranges depending on 
modulation schemes and location. Additionally, some of the frequencies are reserved for 
industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) uses and authorization for use hinges upon 
accepting interference from licensed users and not interfering with those licensed users. 
(Federal Communications Commission 2016). Regulatory bodies in China, Japan, Europe 
and the United States set allowed frequency ranges and channel allocations (IEEE 2011). 
Current commercial uses of 802.15.4 physical networks include interior lighting control, 
audio and video control, thermostat control, interactive toys, smart badges, or multiple 
home monitoring systems. Industry also finds utility in 802.15.4 networks for remote 
sensor and actuator control in monitoring or automation processes (Toscano and Bello 
2012). Even location detection of critical equipment by means other than radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) is possible, though not ideal, for 802.15.4 networks. These 
networks require augmenting upper layer protocol to perform self-computed range 
detection (Wheeler 2007).  
IPv6 also accelerates router processing using an improved option mechanism and 
configures addresses dynamically, if necessary. Addressing with IPv6 protocol increases 
flexibility by increasing the number of address layers. Specifically, IPv6 is built to multi-
cast messages (i.e., sending messages to a specifically tailored audience), without current 
limitations currently seen in IPv4. IPv6’s additional fields even allow users to tailor parts 
of a packet for special handling (Stallings 2014). IP Security (IPSec) also increases with 
IPv6, inherently offering embedded features preventing many, though not all, attacks 
common to wireless sensor networks (WSNs). 
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This thesis studies 6LoWPAN as an available capability, rather than a tangible 
material solution, to fit currently unspecified requirements. Within the defense industry, 
many specific solutions exist in search of requirements to the benefit of the contractor 
that funds such projects with internal research and development (IRAD) dollars. 
6LoWPAN, however, is a concept apart from specific hardware, and this thesis assesses 
the feasibility of further research upon evaluating the security and operability against 
presumed requirements derived through systems engineering techniques. 
B. POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
The IoT concept comprises the future of all machines, all appliances, and all 
digital “things” being assigned an IP address. Possessing an IP address allows the 
potential for communication capability with the rest of the World Wide Web. Existing 
routing and security protocols allow tremendous potential for military application. 
Potential uses of assigning IP addresses to  “things” include secure two-way 
communications capable of securing sensor-specific information. Two-way traffic allows 
sensors to receive secure keying material (KEYMAT) or even data input should the node 
possess onboard storage capacity. 
LoWPANs offer a less costly, more energy efficient, scalable alterative to mesh 
networking in applications not demanding high-throughput or high-definition video. 
Energy efficiency translates directly to lessened weight on the Soldier and less platform 
or facility waste. Furthermore, properly allocating communication periodicity extends 
battery life and increases overall system value. Before the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) released standards on 6LoWPAN, an alliance of companies seeing a need 
for a LoWPAN routing protocol formed the Zigbee Alliance that built upon the IEEE 
defined 802.15.4 standard. Today, the Zigbee Alliance standard, specifically designed for 
802.15.4 networks, accomplishes similar functions of IPv6 though the two standards are 
incompatible. Still other standards have been and can be developed to route traffic over 
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. IPv6 offers the most widely known and community-
supported standard allowing more rapid implementation within a modularized acquisition 
or system integration. 
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C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
This thesis uses systems engineering techniques to explore the security and 
feasibility of using 6LoWPAN in an operational as well as a support setting. Applications 
of 6LoWPAN include, but are not limited to, those previously mentioned.  
Research questions to help determine the feasibility of 6LoWPAN for Army 
usage include: 
1. How might the Army employ 6LoWPAN? 
a. Why would the Army want 6LoWPAN? 
b. What are the limitations of 6LoWPAN? 
c. Where would 6LoWPAN interface current capabilities? 
2. How secure is 6LoWPAN for operational or support use?  
a. What security options are available to 6LoWPAN? 
b. What security mechanisms are most important to the Army? 
c. How well can 6LoWPAN defend against common attacks? 
3. How well can 6LoWPAN support required operations? What is the 
maximum expected performance in terms of range, duration, and 
throughput? 
4. What would 6LoWPAN cost the Army, in terms of SWAP, to employ 
6LoWPAN?  
5. Is further exploration of 6LoWPAN for Army use worthwhile? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Methodology for this thesis will use systems engineering techniques to determine 
the feasibility of 6LoWPAN for two generic Army use cases. An exploration of the 
problem space through user perspectives, potential threats, and operational concepts 
culminating in an operational scenario help shape the operational requirements. 
Combined with defined system boundaries and functional analysis, a complete list of 
requirements develops the framework with which to measure feasibility. Lastly, analysis 
of expected system performance against defined requirements determines feasibility. 
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II. 6LOWPAN OVERVIEW 
A. INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6 
Transmitting data over an IEEE 802.15.4 network requires protocol standards 
above the data link layer (DLL). This thesis specifically analyzes use of IPv6 due to the 
widespread adoption and accepted standards worldwide. IEEE only specifies the 
standards at and below the DLL due to the variety of networking options able to sit atop 
the physical layers. The IETF, initiators of IPv6, exists to make the Internet work better 
and to improve Internet-based communications through standardization (Alvestrand 
2004). Other entities, perhaps lesser known or specifically designed for a sub-network, 
specify alternative protocols usable at any level peer-to-peer communications occur. 
Organizations similar to the IETF may also develop routing protocols that sit atop the 
Data Link Layer (DLL) as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Large collections of protocols used by the Internet Activities Board (IAB) define the 
TCP/IP Protocol Suites. Standardized protocol allows peer-to-peer communication.  
Figure 1.  TCP/IP Protocol Suite. Source: Stallings (2014). 
The Zigbee Alliance, almost synonymous with 6LoWPAN, claims to provide the 
only open, global wireless standard that provides foundation to the Internet of Things. 
The Zigbee Alliance consists of approximately 450 member companies, purportedly non-
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profit, specifically developing products complying to an agreed-upon standard 
established prior to the release of the 6LoWPAN working group’s first requests for 
comment (RFC), 4919 and 4944, both released in 2007 (Montenegro et al. 2007; 
Kushalnagar, Montenegro, and Schumacher 2007). The two protocols, 6LoWPAN and 
Zigbee, accomplish practically identical tasks but 6LoWPAN offers versatility of readily 
running on other physical layer mediums. Bridging a gap between non-Zigbee and 
Zigbee compliant devices requires a more complex gateway application than 6LoWPAN 
(Sarto 2016). This thesis does not explore the nuanced advantages or disadvantages 
between Zigbee and 6LoWPAN but uses 6LoWPAN as the study case due to proclivity 
of information and interoperability on mediums beyond IEEE 802.15.4 networks.  
B. PACKET ARCHITECTURE 
IEEE 802.15.4 networks have a single packet maximum transmission unit (MTU) 
constraint of 127 octets, or bytes (Montenegro et al. 2007). Constraints dictate design 
space, thus, the 127-octet limit of a single packet forces fragmentation of messages 
exceeding the single frame payload size (Montenegro et al. 2007). 6LoWPAN networks, 
although capable of multi-frame transmissions, expect one-frame, or packet, 
transmissions that minimize excessive headers required to fragment and reassemble the 
original message (Kushalnagar, Montenegro, and Schumacher 2007). Additionally, 
because IPv6 requires assembly of packets below the network layer, multiple frame 
packets could prove too much for devices with little memory or processing capacity to 
reassemble (Kushalnagar, Montenegro, and Schumacher 2007). However, depending on 
the selected application of 6LoWPAN, dropped packets may be inconsequential 
assuming most packets arrive at the intended destination. Specific operational 
requirements must dictate the quality of service (QoS) that is technically required. Within 
the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, each protocol layer further restricts the amount of payload 
available to the next higher layer.  
1. Physical Layer 
The 127 bytes in the IEEE 802.15.4 packet includes a 25-byte header in addition 
to the payload. The 25-byte header includes information such as a preamble and delimiter 
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that enable receiving nodes to synchronize with the bit stream, frame control sequence 
number, frame length, source and destination MAC addresses, and others. NXP 
Laboratories demonstrated short addressing in a mesh network by reducing the physical 
layer header to 16 bytes and reducing a network in a star topolgy to only nine bytes as 
shown in Figure 2 (NXP Laboratories 2013). The compression of this field, or any other, 
is not the direct focus of this work but demonstrates parameters allowable for analysis. 
 
The physical layer header compression options can leave as much as 118 octets for 
remaining payload space. 
Figure 2.  Physical Layer Compression Options. 
2. Data Link Layer 
Encryption lies within the upper sub-level of the DLL, the logical link control 
sub-layer (LLC), that sits atop the medium access control (MAC) sub-layer. The 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) demonstrates a viable security layer in an 802.15.4 
network and is specified in the RFC 4919 (Kushalnagar, Montenegro, and Schumacher 
2007). The 128-bit advanced encryption standard, AES-128, exists in IPSec by default. A 
common augmentation of AES includes cipher block chaining message authentication 
code (CBC-MAC). Incorporating an additional counter to the CBC-MAC (CCM) ensures 
uniqueness of every MAC. Networks commonly use AES-CCM with various bit block 
sizes ranging from 32 to 256. The keying material, KEYMAT, request for each AES-
CCM-128 requires 21 octets as specified by RFC 4944 (Montenegro, Kushalnagar, 
Nandakishore, Hui, and Culler 2007). RFCs pertaining to 6LoWPAN do not specify octet 
requirements for 256-bit encryption. AES-CCM creates randomly generated initialization 
vectors, IV, at the sources, unique to each transmission preventing replay attacks 
(Hersent, Boswarthick, and Elloumi 2012; Housley 2005). Encryption, regardless of 
selected size, requires four bytes for frame counting and one byte for key counting. This 
 8
increases the header by five bytes, or octets (Sastry and Wagner 2004). The RFC 4944 
indicates that dividing the encryption bit key size by eight and adding five administrative 
bytes, equates to a theoretical header demand of 37 octets for AES-CCM-256 bit key 
encryption, 29 octets for AES-CCM-192, and 21 octets for AES-CCM-128. Figure 3 
demonstrates the header required for each level of encryption and the corresponding 
remaining payload and results in answering the research question of what security options 
are available to 6LoWPAN. 
The military requires use of AES-CCM-256, a NSA Type I encryption standard, 
for transmitting traffic up to top secret (National Security Agency 2015). However, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) further clarifies AES-CCM-128 
acceptable to transmit sensitive but unclassified government information (Barker and 
Roginsky 2015). A requirement to pass top secret information leaves only 65 bytes of the 
102 bytes on an 802.15.4 network available for upper layer usage. The most current 
6LoWPAN RFC detailing AES specifies only as high as AES-CCM-128 encryption. The 
operational security requirements using 6LoWPAN will be discussed later in this chapter 
but the brief exploration of requirements addresses security mechanisms most important 
to the Army.  
 
The DLL could have increasing bit counts to enhance protection. AES-CCMs-192 and 
256 are not specified by any standard for 6LoWPAN. If implementing AES-CCM-192 or 
256, payload space begins to lessen for higher-level protocols. 
Figure 3.  Data Link Layer Security Options. 
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3. Network Layer 
Above the DLL lies the network layer, specifically IPv6 in 6LoWPANs. In a 
general sense, IPv6 standardization of packet header size to 40 bytes eases the burden on 
inter-routing processing as compared to IPv4 header sizes that vary between 20 and 
40 bytes, depending on options. Additionally, IPv6 limits the size of a single packet per 
transmission, or MTU, to 1280 octets (Kushalnagar, Montenegro, and Schumacher 2007). 
However, a MTU of 1280 octets assumes no lower layer constraints. The IEEE 802.15.4 
MTU constraint of 127 octets presents a notable problem of not leaving much room for 
payload unless compressed. Therefore, an adaptation layer specific to 6LoWPANs 
manages compression as well as fragmentation and reassembly, if necessary, and resides 
just above the DLL and manages interaction with the IPv6 networking layer. An IPv6 
header used over an 802.15.4 network can compress from 40 octets to as low as two 
octets if link-local (link-local presumes no need of full IP addressing due to remaining 
under a common router), as depicted in Table 1, or twelve octets if the network 
implements hopping (Hui and Thubert 2011). Compression of the IPv6 header eliminates 
unnecessary information for a network under specific assumptions. For instance, 
assuming the entire network communicates using IPv6 and if the traffic class and flow 
label fields are zeroed out, then the 32 bits that would be required to present this 
information is reduced to one bit. This is shown in the first three rows of Table 1. The 
same table also shows the payload length derived from the message authentication code 
(MAC) eliminates 16 additional bits. Most significantly, the source and destination 
addresses reduce from 128 bits each to two bits each assuming the network is link-local. 
A message expected to take multiple IP hops requires an additional five bytes. Table 1 
compares the differences in an uncompressed IPv6 header and a fully compressed IPv6 











HC1 length Explanation 
Version 4 bits -- Assuming communicating with IPv6 
Traffic 
class 8 bits 1 bit 
0 = Not compressed. The field is in full size 
1 = Compressed. The traffic class and flow label 
are both zero. Flow label 20 bits 
Payload 
length 16 bits -- 
Can be derived from MAC frame length or 
adaptation layer datagram size (6LoWPAN 
fragmentation header). 
Next 
header 8 bits 2 bits 
Compressed whenever the packet uses UDP, TCP 
or Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 
(ICMPv6). 




bits 2 bits 
If both source and destination IPv6 addresses are 
in link local, their 64-bit network prefixes are 
compressed into a single bit each with a value of 
one. Another single bit is set to one to indicate 
that 64-bit interface identifier are elided if the 
destination can derive them from the 
corresponding link-layer address in the link-layer 





bits 2 bits 
HC2 
encoding -- 1 bit 
Another compression scheme follows a HC1 
header. 
Total 40 bytes 2 bytes 
Fully compressed, the HC1 encoding reduces the 
IPv6 header to two bytes. 
 
The IPv6 header can be significantly reduced under the above assumptions. 
The Network Layer specifically directs the datagram, or packet, to the right place 
in time. Figure 4 depicts two methodologies for traffic forwarding in 6LoWPAN. Mesh-
under forwarding refers to link-local communications, requiring only two total bytes of 
IPv6 header, and Route-over forwarding refers to communications passing over a router. 
The latter methodology requires 12 bytes of IPv6 header (Ee et al. 2010; Olsson 2014).  
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Traffic over a 6LoWPAN can capitalize on interoperability with mediums beyond the 
802.15.4 radios by routing via IP addresses, costing 7 bytes of Network layer header, or 
remain within a network by not passing through a router, costing only 2 bytes of network 
layer header. 
Figure 4.  Routing Options of 6LoWPAN. Source: Olsson (2014). 
6LoWPAN messages remaining uncompressed require 40 bytes of network layer 
header. This is impractical size necessitates compression for a 6LoWPAN network. 
Figure 5 illustrates the compression options and header lengths required for each traffic-
forwarding option. However, fragmentation provides an option for larger messages but 
increases security risks and likelihood of incomplete message traffic. Additionally, 
fragmenting requires an additional four bytes for the initial fragment and five bytes for 
additional fragments of a message (Ee et al. 2010). The network layer payload and header 




Link-local communications need only 2 bytes of network layer header; those requiring IP 
hops over routers require a 12-byte header. An uncompressed header requires 40 bytes 
and is, therefore, never used for 6LoWPAN. 
Figure 5.  Network Layer Options. 
4. Transport Layer 
The transport layer rides atop the networking layer and controls the handling of 
the datagram message. User datagram protocol (UDP) is a connection-less link between 
source and destination requiring no confirmation of receipt. Conversely, transmission 
control protocol (TCP) is a connection-oriented link that controls and confirms packet 
delivery. A network running TCP experiences heightened traffic demands due to control 
messages transiting the network back-and-forth between source and destination. This 
behavior opens networks, specifically wireless networks, to denial of service attacks due 
to packets requiring extensive exchanges before sending any traffic. Networks running 
UDP, however, behave more like a fire-and-forget method, reducing the transport layer 
header length but never receiving message receipt acknowledgement. Accordingly, 
UDP’s lessened header length requirement makes it the prescribed transport layer 
protocol for 6LoWPANs. Figure 6 depicts the UDP header requirement and the 
remaining payload space. 
 
UDP requires less header length but cannot provide receipt confirmation as TCP may. 
TCP requires a 20-byte header and significantly increases utilization sometimes 
associated with line congestion. Therefore, UDP is the prescribed protocol for 
6LoWPAN.  
Figure 6.  Transport Layer Options. 
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5. Application Layer 
Application layer data remains flexible as a user-specific demand requirement. 
This work focuses on the feasible amount of space remaining for user-specific application 
data with best guess estimates of constantly changing application requirements. Simply 
stated, a mesh-under network using a star topology using AES-CCM-128 physical 
security and UDP transport protocol leaves as much as 87 octets per transmission for 
application use. Conversely, a more robust route-over network using a mesh topology, 
AES-CCM-256 physical security and UDP transport protocol leaves only 45 octets per 
transmission for application use. Figure 7 illustrates the full range of viable options. 
 
The most streamlined scenario leaves 87 octets for application layer use while even the 
most robust leaves 45 octets for application layer use. Note that all overhead shows as 
headers but may also include any associated trailers. 
Figure 7.  Range of Layered Options and Resultant Remaining Payload (RP).  
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C. PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
Networks, specifically wireless networks such as 6LoWPAN, inextricably link 
range, throughput, power, and security. Range depends on the amount of power 
transmitted across the system among many other factors. The power requirements depend 
on the amount of transmissions, amount of processing, length of transmissions, and 
internal loss factors. Throughput, or network utilization, depends on the frequency 
selection, the range of each transmission, the bit error rate (BER) and required header 
length. As stated above, each protocol option of the TCP/IP stack drives the header length 
required for each transmission, driving the payload throughput, and power requirements. 
The following section explains the derivation of 6LoWPAN’s system limitations. 
1. Range 
IEEE 802.15.4 radios, at the physical layer, largely determine range of 
6LoWPANs, unless multi-hopping. Without multi-hopping, 802.15.4 radios normally 
range only tens of meters due to range decreasing in free space according to Friis free 
space equation, Equation 2.1 (Rappaport 2002).  
 dmax  PTxGtGr
2
(4 )2 (PRx )NF  (2.1) 
Antenna gain in the transmitting antenna, Gt, and the receiving antenna, Gr, the 
wavelength in meters,  , the minimum power a receiver antenna must receive, PRx, and 
the system loss factor, NF, all contribute to the maximum allowable separation distance, 
dmax, for successful communications. Additionally, this estimation neglects interfering 
signals or atmospheric attenuation due to the relatively short distances achievable by this 
IEEE standardized radio system. The IEEE 802.15.4 specification provides conditions for 




Table 2.   Receiver Sensitivity Conditions. Source: IEEE (2011).
 
 
Term Definition of term Conditions 
Packet Error Rate (PER) Average fraction of 
transmitted packets that are 
not correctly received. 
Average measured over random 
physical service data unit (PSDU) 
Receiver sensitivity Lowest input power for 
which the PER conditions 
are met. 
1) PSDU length of 20 octets 
2) PER < 1% 
3) Power measured at antenna 
terminals 
4) Interference not present 
 
The PER and bit error rate (BER) are assumed synonymous for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
IEEE 802.15.4 radios, as defined by IEEE standard, operate in various modulation 
schemes at each allocated frequency. The throughput, measured in bits per second (bps) 
depends on the modulation scheme selected. While there are multiple modulation 
options, the higher end of the throughput, the 2.4 GHz range, requires offset-quadrature 
phase shift keying (O-QPSK) allowing throughput of 250 kbps while lower frequency O-
QPSK options afford only 100 kbps. Frequency bands around 915 MHz or 868 MHz, 
offer throughputs of only 40 kbps or 20 kbps, respectively, by using binary phase-shift 
keying (BPSK). The same frequency bands may also use O-QPSK, resulting in 
theoretical throughputs up to 100 kbps. Additionally, lower frequencies using BPSK 








Table 3.   Frequency Allocations of Most Common Modulation Schemes  












Sensitivity Authorized Region 
779 - 787 O-QPSK MPSK 
250 













902–928 BPSK ASK 
40 
250 10  -92 dBm 
North 
America 
950–956 GFSK BPSK 
100 
20 21 
0-7      BPSK 1 dBm < 
-92 dBm Japan 8-9      BPSK 10 dBm < 
10-21  GFSK  
2400–
2483.5 O-QPSK 250 16 -3 dBm < 
-85 dBm Worldwide
 
IEEE 802.15.4 radio transmission power capability must exceed -3 dBm but 
frequency allocation requirements may further limit maximum power output (IEEE 
2011). Though the IEEE standard assumes a negligible antenna gain, or a unity value, 
actual radio construction will result in a realized gain. Assuming a dipole antenna 
construction, as an example, derived equations that roughly approximate dipole antenna 
gain to an easily calculable value (Equation 2.2) such that d is the full length of the 
receiving antenna, assumed to be the device diameter for extremely small 802.15.4 radios 
as an assumption and ߣ is the signal wavelength (Harney 2004). This relationship allows 















Using, for example, 2.45 GHz (wavelength of 122.45mm), and device maximum 
length of one inch, or 25.4 mm, the antenna gain equates to only 0.09 while a device 
maximum length of even two inches increases the factor to 1.44. More effective 
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antennae, such as fractal antennas could boost antenna gain but is not explored in this 
work. 
IEEE 802.15.4 systems commonly advertise transmission ranges of 10-30 meters 
(Gutierrez et al. 2006). As previously seen in Equation 2.1, parameters that increase 
range include higher antenna gain, more transmitted power, lower transmitting 
frequencies, or lower receiving antenna sensitivity.  
Finally, attenuation through structural materials reduces transmitted power at a 
determined rate (Equation 2.3) and commonly relies on empirical results (Jenn and 
Sumagaysay 2004). The relationship is a logarithmic value associated with a ratio of 
power transmitted through the surface, Ptransmitted, compared to power emitted from the 
source, Pincident. Studies indicate approximately 10 dB loss through a 10-inch concrete 
wall (Jenn and Sumagaysay 2004).  






   (2.3) 
2. Throughput 
Frequency, range, topology, and network size determine throughput across a 
6LoWPAN radio link. Frequency allocations derive from country authorization or, if in a 
hostile environment, allocations from internal de-conflictions and threat analysis. Lower 
frequencies often travel longer distances and are generally more persistent while higher 
frequency ranges allow higher throughput but competition with other devices increases. 
Bluetooth technology and microwave ovens also operate in the 2.4 GHz range, though 
Bluetooth is similarly unlicensed, and microwaves operate in a Faraday cage. 
Investigations into interference levels of Bluetooth and microwave ovens find no 
significant influence to 802.15.4 networks at ranges nearing one meter (Sikora and Groza 
2005). 
Range, as described above, establishes a threshold distance at which a desired 
throughput can be achieved, as a function of frequency. Additionally, increasing nodal 
count on a common access point progressively detracts from the maximum throughput 
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amount. Small networks with periodic traffic will likely not notice degradation in 
throughput but as a networks scale larger, latency will occur in a network with decreasing 
access periods.  
IEEE 802.15.4 networks use carrier sense multiple access with collision 
avoidance (CSMA-CA) or ALOHA channel access (IEEE 2011). Whether or not a 
personal area network (PAN) coordinator desires slotted or unslotted CSMA-CA access. 
CSMA-CA essentially requires a node test the target node, or nodes, for a ready to 
receive or not ready to receive status. If the target node, or nodes, appears ready to 
receive, the sending node transmits the message. If the target node, or nodes, does not 
appear ready to receive, the sending node waits a variable amount of time before 
attempting to re-send. The pre-determined CSMA-CA protocol determines the amount of 
time before attempting the retransmission. CSMA-CA options include slotted or non-
slotted and persistent or non-persistent. Using a slotted CSMA-CA ensures all assigned 
nodes to a network get guaranteed time slots (GTS) in which to request access. Using 
non-persistent CSMA-CA protocol allows scalability since only transmitting members of 
the network compete for time slots. Additionally, the amount of throughput of CSMA-
CA depends heavily on the expected time of propagation. Nodes separated by greater 
distances decrease the normalized throughput.  Nodes separated by approximately 
300 meters experience a throughput reduction by a factor of approximately 0.86 and 
separations of 30 meters experience a throughput reduction by a factor of approximately 
0.96 (Agrawal and Zeng 2014). 
Voice communications require significant amounts of throughput with most 
estimates requiring a minimum of 64 kbps. Additionally, any packet header detracts from 
the amount of payload on which voice communications can travel. If only 45 bytes 
remain out of 127, only 35.4% of the throughput is available for payload traffic in the 
worst case. In the best case, 78 remaining bytes allow for approximately 61% of 
throughput available for payload traffic. In addition, the CSMA-CA protocol requires 
acknowledgements and timers resulting in packets not being sent continuously (Hersent, 
Boswarthick, and Elloumi 2012). Node separation’s heavy influence on slotted non-
persistent CSMA-CA reduces the realized throughput by the factors discussed in the 
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preceding paragraph. Therefore, at 300 meters, the realized throughput to expect lies 
between 0.30 and 0.53 of the channel throughput.  
A recent expert on the IoT estimates that of the 250 kbps bandwidth, only 50 kbps 
(or 20%) is usable for applications and only if no other devices compete for network 
access (Hersent, Boswarthick, and Elloumi 2012). Applying the above factor of 0.86, 
only 76 to 132 kbps remain for any given node in the network for application use 
assuming only a point-to-point link. This estimate is very close to other estimates of 
50 kbps in light of expected header lengths and CSMA-CA protocols (Hersent, 
Boswarthick, and Elloumi 2012). 
3. Power and Energy 
IEEE 802.15.4 standard writers assumed power for devices would come from 
batteries intended to remain in service long periods of time but also capable of using 
mains, or grid-derived, power (IEEE 2011). Power consumption depends not only on the 
level of power transmitted, but also on the periodicity at which the component transmits, 
processes, and receives data. 6LoWPAN physical operating constraints dictate a floor 
output capability of -3 dBm while only local frequency regulations dictate transmission 
power ceiling levels. ISM bands limit transmission power to a maximum of 1 mW 
(Hersent, Boswarthick, and Elloumi 2012). 
Joules (J) represents the International System of Units (SI) measure of energy. 
Batteries drain at differing rates depending on discharge current, in milliamps (mA), of 
direct current (DC). Voltage multiplied by amperage totals power and multiplying by 
time, in seconds, results in total energy. As an example, a typical 1.5-volt (V) AA 
alkaline battery containing 1700 mAh of current capacity contains 9180 Joules. 
Considering, then, that 6LoWPAN devices emit at the milliwatt level, nor at a constant 
level, the anticipated duration of a network and its associated devices should span long 
periods even with a much smaller initial voltage amount. Additional energy source 
parameters, assuming a device receives power from battery, include capacity, in joules, 
and efficiency. Slower power drain increases efficiency (Pedram and Wu 1999). Given 
the low power draw of 802.15.4 radios, this paper assumes a nominal value of 90%. For 
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the purposes of this paper, node size drives battery size and weight limitations. Ideally, 
commonly sized batteries ease logistical burden in usage cases. This thesis explores the 
expected lifetime of an expected node given expected usage parameters. Duracell 
batteries, a very common brand name battery in North America, designs battery metrics 
in accordance with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The density of 
batteries varies by chemical composition but, for comparison, Duracell’s 1700 mAh 
NiMH rechargeable AA battery weighs 28 grams at a length of two inches and nominally 
discharges at 1.2 volts (Duracell 2016). Duracell’s 1000mAh NiMH rechargeable AAA 
battery weighs 12.8 grams at a length of one and three-quarters inches and nominally 
discharges at 1.2 volts as well (Duracell 2016). Therefore, a typical AA rechargeable 
battery nominally contains 7344 Joules and a typical AAA rechargeable battery 
nominally contains 4320 Joules. 
The transmission power, as a function of distance, contributes most significantly 
to the power drain on a device. An additional drain, assumed a constant value in this 
work, includes data aggregation, EDA. EDA’s assumed value in this work is 5 nJ/bit in 
keeping with estimates of similar work on microsensors such that Equation 2.4 holds true 
(Heinzelman, Chandrakasan, and Balakrishnan 2002). Multiplying by the message length 
in bits, L, determines the overall EDA as a function of message length. 
 EDA(L)  5nJ(L)bit   (2.4) 
The same study presented a method of determining energy dissipation per bit of 
data using binary values for distance, near or far, and varying message size (Heinzelman, 
Chandrakasan, and Balakrishnan 2002). The study also used fixed distances assuming 
polynomial free-space loss at a rate of distance squared, d2, within a designated distance 
before assuming a multi-hop transmission (Heinzelman, Chandrakasan, and Balakrishnan 
2002). The study’s multi-hop transmission exhibits a quadratic energy loss at a rate of d4, 
to account for multipath fading (Heinzelman, Chandrakasan, and Balakrishnan 2002). 
Figure 8 illustrates the exchange of energy as a compilation of ETx and EDA per bit. 
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Heinzelman’s model depends on range, processing, and packet size, though transmission 
power and processing power hold constant with only binary input to distance (near or 
far). The electronic drain should be confirmed by actual product testing. The referenced 
source provides parameters based on similar testing.  
Figure 8.  Energy Transfer Model. Source: Heinzelman et al. (2002). 
However, adjusting distance allows further analysis. Thus, multiplying the 
transmission power by message length in bits, L, and dividing by bit rate, R, in bits per 
second, reveals the transmission energy dissipation rate, ETx, as a function of message 
size and range as in Equation 2.5. 
 E(L,d)  PTx (L)
R
  (2.5) 
Therefore, combining Equations 2.4 and 2.5, the energy expended to transmit a 
message of size, L, in bits, over a relatively close distance, d, in free space, a radio 
expends: 
 EFS (L,d)  EDA  ETx   (2.6) 
4. Topology Options 
6LoWPAN offers network topology options of star or meshed. As explained by 
Figure 2, networks within a single router require less addressing bytes and can operate as 
either star or meshed. Power consumption at the central node, or full function device 
(FFD), surpasses power consumption of any individual node. The 802.15.4 specification 
also refers to outlying nodes as restricted function devices, RFDs (IEEE 2011). Star 
topologies generally drain individual, or RFD, devices at a rate driven only by distance, 
message length and periodicity while the centralized FFD device’s energy consumption 
scales at a rate equal to the number of interconnected RFDs. RFDs in mesh networks 
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generally drain at varying rates driven by proximity to the cluster head, message length 
and periodicity, and number of network nodes.  
D. SECURITY 
1. Obstacles 
Wireless networks such as 6LoWPAN possess vulnerabilities common to any 
wireless network but the inclusion of IPv6’s embedded security algorithm, IPSec, offers 
significant protection. Many obstacles limit security implementations to include limited 
storage, energy restrictions, and MTU (IEEE 2011). Limited storage onboard a sensor 
limits the ability to process large algorithms or large quantities of even the smallest 
algorithms. Energy restrictions are user-dependent as the size of the nodal power supply 
may be quite small if desired on a PAN though perhaps not as restrictive for a less mobile 
sensor field permanently emplaced. The MTU of 6LoWPAN already limits packet size 
and increased security, as previously discussed, only further restricts remaining usable 
payload space.  
2. Resistance against Common Wireless Network Attacks 
Predicting every type of attack or scenario remains impossible. Measuring 
resiliency against the most common or most dangerous attacks to a wireless network, 
however, may highlight a capability’s strengths and weaknesses or value in further 
investigation for military usage. However, implementation considerations must precede 
any examination of a network’s vulnerability. The IETF provides RFC 3756 to present 
three generic implementation models (Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). Each 
model presents unique challenges to security, the most vulnerable being an ad-hoc 
network. Therefore, this thesis investigates the resiliency of 6LoWPAN against denial of 
service (DoS) attacks, router or routing specific attacks such as sinkhole attacks, and non-
router or non-routing related attacks such as neighbor discovery (ND) attacks from a best 
and worst case trust model. This synopsis aims to generalize the wide array of active and 
passive techniques used against wireless networks. IPSec’s authentication headers, AH, 
in conjunction with AES provides significant security against most malicious attacks. The 
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research question of 6LoWPAN’s resistance to these common attacks is addressed in the 
following sections. 
a. Denial of Service (DoS) 
A DoS attack requires that a malicious node exist within transmission range of a 
threat but does not require co-location of the nodes (Vines 2002). DoS attacks generally 
occur by a malicious source overtaking the attention of a victim node’s receiving antenna 
and distracting its processor to the point of denying it productive participation in its own 
friendly network (Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). There is little defense any 
wireless network can provide against physical DoS aside from decreasing the receiving 
antenna’s sensitivity or increasing the transmitting power within a network. By 
decreasing sensitivity, range quickly diminishes without an increase in transmitted power. 
Likewise, increasing power drains power resources more quickly and increases the 
network footprint and vulnerability to other attacks. 
b. Router or Routing Attacks 
Attacks involving routers or routing take many forms. Sinkhole attacks, 
sometimes referred to as redirect attacks, cause a node to unknowingly send traffic to 
what seems to be an ideal path to the intended destination. A malicious last hop router 
exists as generic IPv6 threat in which a malicious router masquerades as a legitimate last 
hop router on a network in which an entering node is attempting to discover one 
(Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). Another method involves deleting the actual 
default router from a node or multiple nodes’ routing tables. This attack could follow a 
DoS attack or even after sending minimal router lifetime over a spoofed router 
advertisement (Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). Additional router-related threats 
include a good router going bad, spoofed redirect messages, bogus on-link prefix, bogus 
address configuration prefix, and parameter spoofing (Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 
2004). Use of statically assigned IP addresses precludes each of these threats (Nikander, 
Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). With use of dynamic host configuration protocol, DHCP, 
mitigating the stated threats becomes necessary. Research continues to investigate 
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methods of mitigating DHCP against such threats (Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 
2004).  
An additional threat specific to CSMA-CA includes a malicious source sending 
inert packets with a correct preamble equivalent to 802.15.4 protocol. If the malicious 
source broadcasts messages to the access point, or router, at a rate faster than the other 
nodes’ back-off timers (responsible for avoiding collisions), an access point can be 
denied service. 
c. Non-router or Non-routing Attacks 
Attacks taking place beneath the router also come in many forms. Non-router 
attacks such as neighbor solicitation and advertisement attempt to create unwarranted 
relationships between MAC Addresses and IP addresses for the purposes of redirection, 
even underneath the router. Once redirected, a malicious node can redirect, exploit, or 
even destroy packets. 6LoWPAN provides excellent defense against ND attacks. Turning 
off performance optimization, a command telling nodes to populate a neighbor cache 
table, as more links become available, routes all traffic through predetermined routes 
(Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). Star topologies better lend themselves to 
disabling performance optimization while disabling the function cripples a major 
advantage of mesh networking. Mesh networks, constantly attempting to optimize traffic 
routing, more aptly fall victim to this form of redirect denial of service attack (Nikander, 
Kempf, and Nordmark 2004).  
Similarly, a neighbor unreachability detection (NUD) attack happens when a 
sending node cannot reach the desired destination node after multiple tries. After a 
requisite number of failures, the sending node flushes the desired destination node’s 
address from the standard address resolution protocol (ARP) table and looks for a valid 
one. During a NUD attack, a malicious node sends fabricated unavailable messages to the 
sending node to expedite the dropping of the desired destination node. Preventing the 
actual process of the desired destination node becoming unreachable or how the sending 
node behaves in such a situation provides the best defense against a NUD denial of 
service attack. In a similar manner, preventing hosts from obtaining addresses using 
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stateless address auto-configuration prevents duplicate address detection (DAD) denial of 
service attacks (Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004). Using mesh-under networking 
alleviates any threat from additional router-level ND attacks outlined in RFC 3756 
(Nikander, Kempf, and Nordmark 2004).  
E. GEOLOCATION 
Without going into the methods 6LoWPAN uses to geo-locate other nodes, 
research accomplished on the topic reveals some overarching insights. First, 
implementing a real-time location system (RTLS) requires at least three anchor nodes 
(Martinez and Lastra 2011). Additionally, a RTLS requires nodes contacting an anchor 
node receive immediate acknowledgements, something not associated with UDP as the 
transport layer protocol (Martinez and Lastra 2011). Thus, using 6LoWPAN to geo-
locate potentially requires using TCP, requiring a significantly longer header length, and 
the network to differentiate each node as an anchor node or not (Martinez and Lastra 
2011). 
F. DESIGN PARAMETERS 
Table 4 lists a compilation of the design parameters in which a 6LoWPAN system 
must operate. Exceptions outside of the parameters are possible but require tradeoffs 
from other parameters. The table answers the research question of 6LoWPAN limitations 








Table 4.   Compilation of Design Parameters. Adapted from IEEE (2011). 
Parameter Minimum Maximum Cost –or– Limiting 
Design Factors 
Encryption AES-CCM-128 AES-CCM-256 Header Length (bits) 
Resiliency Withstand DoS None Scalability 
Throughput 20 kbps 250 kbps Energy, Time 
Range 10m 200m LOS Battery Life 
Antenna Length (Gain) 
Transmitted Power -3 dBm 1 dBW Battery Life 
Receiver Sensitivity -85 dBm (BPSK) 





Battery Size Length: None 
Weight: None 
Max length of node 
Less than 60g (2 AA) 
User weight limitations 























III. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
In systems engineering, operational concepts or usage scenarios commonly 
support generated system technical requirements (Buede 2009). The generated system 
technical requirements must clearly derive from, and easily trace back to, operational 
requirements. Operational concepts allow defining the anticipated environment, 
interoperability with other systems, potential threats, and how the users employ the 
system to more easily highlight specific operational requirements ultimately leading to 
comprehensive system technical requirements (Buede 2009).  
Similarly, Benjamin Blanchard and Wolter Fabrycky (2011) define a generic 
approach for all system acquisitions and follow-on deployments. Regardless of all 
factors, systems engineers execute conceptual design, preliminary design, detail design 
and development, production/construction, operational use and system support, and 
ultimately, retirement during the lifecycle of a system (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
Operational requirements, a concept of support and maintenance, technical performance 
measures, functional analysis, and allocation of design criteria from the system level to 
sub-systems, lie within the conceptual design phase and serve to establish system 
technical requirements (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011).  
The Army’s employment of a low-powered, wireless, personal area network in an 
operational or support setting defines the system within the scope of this thesis. The 
assessment of 6LoWPAN’s employment leverages Blanchard and Fabrycky’s approach 
to construct comprehensive usage scenarios to generate clearly derived system technical 
requirements. 
A. BFT SCENARIO 
1. Potential Opportunities 
The inception of networking dismounted troops with real-time data began around 
1989 as a part of the Land Warrior program, the Army’s first attempt at networking 
individual troops on the battlefield (Gourley 2012). Having occasional name changes, by 
June 2010, on the Army’s 235th birthday, it renamed Ground Soldier System Increment 1 
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as Nett Warrior, in honor of WWII Medal of Honor winner Robert B. Nett (Gourley 
2012). Requirements of Nett Warrior include, but are not limited to, providing command-
and-control solutions down to the team leader level (Gourley 2012). The first prototype 
systems weighed as much as 10 pounds without a backhaul capability, while more recent 
versions weigh as little as three pounds on top of the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) on 
the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) backhaul link (Gourley 2012). The JTRS SRW 
link typically occurs over an AN/PRC-154 handheld Rifleman Radio capable of carrying 
unclassified voice and data traffic, lasting at least 12 hours on a 7.2 Ah Li-Ion battery, 
ranging over three kilometers, and weighing approximately 1.7 pounds (Thales Defense 
& Security 2016). The AN/PRC-154A handheld Rifleman Radio, capable of carrying 
secret and below traffic, generally boasts the same specifications but a shorter range of 
just two kilometers and lower battery life of over nine hours due to having only a 5.8 Ah 
Li-Ion rechargeable battery (Thales Defense & Security 2016). For geolocation, the 
Army currently possesses the defense advanced GPS receiver (DAGR). The DAGR 
weighs 454 grams, or just less than one pound, including the provided AA batteries, with 
a continuous lifetime of fourteen hours but does not self-propagate location information 
beyond the display screen (Rockwell Collins 2016). In total, the dismounted capability 
available today provides voice and data at the specifications above at a weight of nearly 
six pounds per user, including the DAGR. The Army’s baseline requirement is for a 
dismounted Soldier to know his own location, the location of friendlies, and the enemy’s 
locations (Leland and Porche 2004). The 6LoWPAN capability may offer comparable 
performance at a lower SWAP, translating to lower Soldier payload. Lower Soldier 
payload well answers the research question of why the Army may desire 6LoWPAN. 
2. Stakeholder Perspective 
A stakeholder’s analysis of BFT provides insight to the most important 
capabilities of an operationally deployed system. The dismounted Soldier on the ground 
receives position location of other users as well as enemy locations entered by any 
situationally aware user. The Soldier benefits from BFT through increased protection 
from fratricide in an increasing complex combined arms fight, but can have an adverse 
effect if not operating properly. In addition, Soldiers and leaders both aspire to lessen 
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payload weight demands on Soldiers. Current initiatives aim to reduce the weight burden 
on Soldiers, often surpassing 100 pounds, while maintaining or enhancing current 
operating capabilities (Friedl and Santee 2011). Therefore, any additional technology 
must be as light as possible while maintaining or exceeding current operational 
effectiveness. For sustained effectiveness, the technology must prove directly beneficial 
to the user and maintainer of the system. A subjective judgment exists about what a 
dismounted leader below the squad leader level needs to receive via a network given all 
typically remain within LOS of each other. 
A typical infantry company contains three maneuver platoons, a platoon leader 
(PL), assisted by a platoon sergeant (PSG) leads each platoon and reports to the company 
commander. A platoon typically contains three squads, each led by a squad leader (SL) 
who reports directly to the PL and PSG. Each squad typically contains two teams, led by 
a team leader (TL) directly reporting to the SL. Lastly, a team typically consists of three 
to nine Soldiers. Figure 9 shows a generic Army Infantry company hierarchy. 
 
Companies may or may not have combat support and service support elements attached 
in addition to headquarters elements. The figure is meant to demonstrate to the reader the 
amount of assets included in any given company, platoon, squad, or team. A company 
typically contains 2-3 platoons, a platoon typically contains 2-4 squads, a squad typically 
contains 2-3 teams, and a team typically contains 3-9 Soldiers. This thesis assumes 6 
Soldiers plus a team leader comprising one team.  
Figure 9.  Hierarchical Structure of a Typical Army Infantry Company’s  
Maneuver Elements. 
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Figure 10 shows two Nett Warrior connectivity implementations linking Soldiers 
to the network at the TL level. Figure 11 shows an alternative architecture that replaces 
the SRW backhaul capability from the SL to TL with a lower SWAP, 6LoWPAN 
capability. 
 
While linkage options can be tailored to need, Nett Warrior capability does not currently 
reach below the TL level and uses the AN/PRC-154A Handheld Rifleman Radio as a link 
between nodes. The Rifleman Radio can, however, be issued to all Soldiers for voice and 
data transmissions separately from Nett Warrior. 
Figure 10.  Two Potential Linkage Options Using Nett Warrior’s AN/PRC-154A 
Handheld Rifleman Radio SRW Link between Nodes. 
 
Potential solution space could exist for 6LoWPAN to meet operational requirements and 
reduce weight burdens. 
Figure 11.  Two Potential Linkage Options Replacing Nett Warrior’s 
AN/PRC-154A Handheld Rifleman Radio SRW Link 
with 6LoWPAN at TL Level. 
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3. Operational Scenario 
In this operational scenario, the situation includes an infantry platoon conducting 
a presence patrol in a hostile urban setting. The objective is to ensure safety within the 
local market by executing a coordinated dismounted movement through a market area 
just prior to peak business hours. The friendly forces include the dismounted platoon, the 
medical casualty evacuation (MEDEVAC) team, and the local populace. Potential threats 
include elements embedded within the population planning to deny communication 
channels and split the dismounted unit in order to ambush a smaller unit subset. It is 
assumed each TL has a 6LoWPAN device that automatically passes location data among 
platoon nodes and stands prepared to pass additional data messages between platoon 
nodes in a fully meshed topology as shown in Figure 10. This also includes BFT 
information subsequently distributed across the larger joint battle command (JBC). The 
time is 1500 hours, local.  
Each Soldier observes his assigned sector of fire, maintaining appropriate spacing 
to prevent a grenade blast from incapacitating more than one platoon member. The PL 
and PSG engage local shop owners and security forces with the help of assigned 
translators. At 1530 hours, the platoon leader, currently within 50 meters of each SL and 
seeing all nodes of his platoon on his display window receives a time-sensitive tip of a 
nearby meeting potentially involving a high-value target (HVT). The PL dispatches an 
audience-specific movement command over Nett Warrior on his display window that 
only his SLs and PSG all receive on their display windows. The PSG and first squad 
maneuver to a better supporting position as the PL maneuvers with second and third 
squads. At this point, the two platoon elements are no longer within LOS. At 1600 hours, 
from a building two blocks away, unexpected sniper fire wounds a member of second 
squad, Bravo team. The TL immediately shouts the suspected direction of the sniper and 
moves to cover before reporting the casualty over the platoon network via voice with an 
estimated distance and direction of the sniper. Immediately, all remaining elements move 
to cover-and-concealment while the Soldiers closest to the casualty attempt to drag him 
to a safe position. The PL attempts to better identify the location of the shooter over the 
platoon network. All networked leaders digitally provide their point of view in attempts 
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to locate the shooter. The suspected enemy location is entered into the platoon’s BFT 
overlay using standard procedures for dismounted operations. By 1610 hours, the fire 
team establishes security and a casualty collection point (CCP) around the Soldier and 
earmarks the location in the BFT overlay, as the platoon medic treats the casualty. 
Meanwhile, the battalion’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in overwatch has arrived on 
station to observe the uploaded sniper position transmitted to the higher echelon’s BFTs. 
The PL’s Nett Warrior allows live UAV feed streaming. Overwatch of the suspected 
position aids in locating the suspected sniper. Simultaneously, the medic informs the PSG 
the casualty requires immediate medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). The PSG directs the 
SL, who in turn directs his TL, to transmit a multicast MEDEVAC request. By 1615 
hours, the PSG’s remaining element is set in overwatch position; the PL’s element 
performs flanking movements until reaching the bottom floor of the suspected building. 
Any lifting or shifting of fires is done using friendly position data on the BFT overlay. At 
1630 hours, assuming the building size and layout is within the element’s ability to clear, 
second and third squads enter the building with appropriate tactics moving from room to 
room. Within the building, Soldiers methodically clear and secure each room. For at least 
30 minutes, available team members ascend to the suspected sniper position until 
neutralizing the threat. Simultaneously, the PSG’s element is monitoring the building for 
any fleeing personnel out of the building of interest. Upon confirming neutralization of 
the threat by 1730 hours, the PL re-establishes internal platoon communications, re-
establishes accountability while simultaneously observing each team’s location on the 
BFT overlay. The CCP element, having assisted the MEDEVAC team, rejoins the PSG’s 
element. Subsequently, the PL provides a follow-up report across the higher command 
network and coordinates follow-on actions.  
From this single scenario, many key aspects of the TL links become apparent. 
Soldiers may default to voice communications when speed necessitates though data 
leaves a longer footprint that populates the master overlay. Two necessary parameters of 
geolocation are distance and direction from known position data. They can be determined 
without a map overlay, but this does necessitate a need for a screened display showing 
the user’s location and distance and direction to other friendly nodes regardless of 
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surroundings. Terrain association, however, allows Soldiers to enter an enemy location to 
the network overlay or any point of interest without a self geo-locating capability. 
Obviously, the system must interface with Nett Warrior or physical map. Assuming a 
patrolling speed of no greater than two meters/second and a location accuracy of plus or 
minus ten meters, automatic position updates even every ten meters equate to an update 
rate of ten seconds. Building clearing operations typically reduce movement speed, 
decreasing the refresh rate requirement. This hypothetical mission lasted less than three 
hours but despite best plans, situations largely affect mission times. A system should not 
require battery recharge or replacement during mission execution, but this should be 
achievable quickly should the need arise. The automated communications between nodes 
must be secure enough to prevent spoofing or denial of service. Range between nodes 
averaged 50 meters, line of sight (LOS), but could extend beyond 200 meters, or even 
face obstructed LOS (OLOS) if within earshot, or relatively close distances, and 
sometimes as close as 20 meters with varying multipath interference during room 
clearing operations. Current doctrine for squad level tactics dictate that every Soldier 
should remain within sight of the team leader and every team leader should maintain 
visual contact with the squad leader. Doctrine trains leaders to control movement through 
use of hand and arm signals (U.S. Army 2007). Physically, cover and concealment pose a 
threat to communication systems requiring line-of-sight (LOS) communications. Team 
leaders typically receive more information than transmit and transmissions may often be 
standardized report formats. Voice commands often transmit over the platoon network 
but typically exchange between the PL or PSG to the SLs. A pre-formatted MEDEVAC 
request reduces time and bandwidth over free-text. However, pre-formatted reports 
require on-board caching and storing demands on each node. Sender and receiver 
identifications inherently populate using unique IP addressing. Command actions given 
digitally could require one byte per character or a preset listing of commands potentially 
using fewer bytes. Four bytes, for instance, allow for 24 or 16 options. Five bytes allows 
for 32 options versus a five-letter free-text word. Automated location reporting requires 
transmission and receipt of military grid reference system (MGRS) grid location, shift 
from a known point. Timing requires only an hour, minute, and second entry if not time-
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stamped by the network. The requirement to transmit and receive textual commands still 
exists but could be reduced by use of specifically selected emojis knowing the age-old 
adage that “a picture is worth a thousand words.” A requirement exists to locate and 
adjudicate enemy locations across a network, another potentially pre-formatted report. 
Soldiers and leaders may require node hopping to reach an intended audience 
necessitating additional indirect receiving and transmitting by each node at some rate. In 
this single scenario, no outside entities required entry into the platoon network allowing 
for static addressing. Lastly, Soldiers using network technology expect a way to 
troubleshoot a broken communications link and, therefore, expect a user-friendly 
interface for such purposes without additional tools or parts incurring more weight and 
space. 
Various Army field manuals define reports common to platoon and squad-level 
operations. The operational situation above highlights a medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC) report, shown in Table 5. A pre-formatted 9-line MEDEVAC request 
requires at least 57 bytes in a wartime setting, and potentially far more in a peacetime 
setting where an expectation of descriptive fields exist. An example of a generic call for 
fire (CFF), shown in Table 6 requires a maximum of 40 bytes for any one transmission 
but could be as low as 33 bytes for any one transmission assuming a preformatted 
message. Preformatted messaging offers lessened cross-traffic being sent but more 
internal storage capacity at each node. This assumption would require additional 
exploration to determine the associated power drain to perform this role at each node. For 
any report, the byte requirement for each assumes cached reports exist on all nodes, 







Table 5.   An Example of a Pre-formatted 9-Line Medical Evacuation Request 
and Expected Byte Consumption 
Line/Item Example Total Bytes (max) 
1/Location of pickup site by grid 
coordinates with grid zone letters 
MD 73245 23949  
or 
48S MD 73245 23949 
15 
2/Requesting Unit Radio 
frequency, call sign, and suffix 
FM153.843*, Bravo21 20 (depending on call sign 
length).** 
3/Patient Precedence Code and 
Quantity 
A-1; B-1; C-3;D-2 8 
4/Special Equipment Required A 4 
5/Number of Patients by 






6/Security of Pickup Site 
(wartime only) 
N,P, E, or X 1 (wartime only) 
6b/Number and type of wound, 
injury, or illness (peacetime only) 
# + explanation (unspecified) (peacetime only) 
7/Method of marking pickup site A,B,C,D, or E with optional 
description such as C, Green for 
green smoke (using a two letter 
color code) 
3 
8/Patient Nationality and Status A,B,C,D, or E 1 
9a/CBRN contamination 
(Chemical/Biological/Radiation/ 
Nuclear)  (wartime only) 
N,B, or C 1 (wartime only) 
9b/Terrain Description Descriptive details Unspecified (peacetime only) 
Peacetime Total (worst case)  55 + unspecified description 
fields 
Peacetime Total (worst case) 
leveraging IP addressing for 
sender identification 
 35 + unspecified description 
Wartime Total (worst case)  57 
Wartime Total (worst case) 
leveraging IP addressing for 
sender identification 
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Adapted from FM3-21.7, Table 6-1, pages 6-12 through 6-13. *The radio frequency of the unit 
leadership net may not be the same as the unit network. Note, each character consumes one byte 
of data. **Using IP, address labels are placed on every transmitted packet, alleviating the need 
for line 2. 
The operational situation above also highlights a constant exchange of position 
data. Line one of Table 5 highlights that only 15 bytes are required for position data, to 
obtain an accuracy of ten meters.  
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Table 6.   An Example of a Pre-formatted Call for Fire (CFF) Exchange and 
Expected Byte Consumption per Transmission.  
Adapted from U.S. Army (1991). 
Transmission/Item Example Total Bytes (max) 
1a/Observer call sign and fire 
direction center (FDC) call sign 
“Bravo45, this is Bravo21” 16 
1b/Type of Mission and size of 
element  
Adjust Fire, Fire for Effect, 
Suppress, Immediate 
Suppression/Smoke, followed by 
an optional last letter of call sign 
of desired FDC 
4* 
1c/Method of Target Location Polar, laser polar plot, shift from 
known point, grid 
3* 
1d/Potential transmission of 
target location if immediate 
effects are requested or shift from 
a known point 
AA 12345 54321 
Or 
shift from AA1122 
16 
 Total 40 
 Total (leveraging IP addressing 
for sender identification)** 
24 
 Total Received Back from FDC Less than 40 (or 24 leveraging IP 
addressing) 
2a/Position of Target AA 12345 54321 or 
Direction 2300, Left 350, Add 
400 (2300MIL,L350,A400) 
15 
 Total** 15 
 Total Received Back from FDC Less than 15 
3a/Target Description Dismounted Battalion in the open 
(free text) 
Less than 30 
 Total** Less than 30 
 Total Received Back from FDC Less than 30 
3b/Requested Munition HE,WP,ICM (various weapon 
types) 
3 
 Total** 33 
 Total Received Back from FDC 15 + 2 bytes challenge 
4/Authentication I authenticate “alpha” 2 
 Total** 2
 Total Received Back from FDC - 
*Assuming brevity codes become doctrinal. All transmissions to and from the observer 
could feasibly remain under 24 bytes but the initial transmission could drop the location 
data in initial transmission if performed in near concurrent time by pre-programmed BFT 
updates. Thus making the worst case become less than 30 bytes required for any one 
transmission.** Using IP addressing, sender identification and authentication gets 
accomplished each transmission.  
Compiling the operational requirements leads to a list of required functions and 
results in answering the research question of where 6LoWPAN could interface current 
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capabilities. The functions in Figure 12 enable the TL to join the platoon voice and data 
network. 
 
The functions cleanly translate into operational requirements from which technical 
requirements can be derived. 
Figure 12.  Essential Functions for Networking TLs to the Platoon Network. 
The same approach allows analysis of requirements to enhance current 
capabilities such as integrating the Soldier level below the TL level. The same 
operational scenario allows extraction of Soldier level usage profiles if necessary, leading 
to a near identical functional decomposition. Measuring relative advantage over current 
capability must evaluate the effectiveness of adding both capability and weight to the 
Soldier level. These functions each possess objectively measurable and technical 
thresholds, or requirements. 
B. BFT BACKHAUL TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
The technical requirements of the BFT backhaul capability must trace back to the 
aforementioned operational requirements. Table 7 places performance metrics on 
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operational requirements, quickly deriving system technical requirements for operational 
use at and below the platoon blue force tracking backhaul capability. 
Table 7.   Translation of BFT Backhaul Operational Requirements 
to System Technical Requirements. 
Operational 
Requirement System Technical Requirement Performance Metrics 
A.1 
Interface with Nett 
Warrior 
The system must be IP based 
The system should be compatible with Nett Warrior 
physical connection interfaces with no net power 
exchange 
Network Interfaces 




The system must operate at a maximum range of 
300 meters 
The system must be capable of over 7.5 hours 
(T)(x3 expected usage time); or 25 hours (O)(x10 
expected usage time) continuous hours of operation 
Support multi-hop performance or mesh 











System must transmit and receive acceptable 
(subjective) voice quality with acceptable error rate 
 
Throughput (bps), Latency 
(seconds) Message, Packet 




The system must successfully transmit and receive 
position data, 15 bytes maximum (T) from all 
assigned nodes; transmit and receive pre-formatted 
reports, 57 bytes maximum (O) 
Message Length (bytes) 
Data Rate (bps) 





The system must automatically maintain device 
geolocation data to an accuracy of ±10 meters at a 










The system must be lighter than the AN/PRC-152A 
weighing less than 1.7 pounds (0.77kg) (T), or 50% 
relative advantage, weighing less than 0.85 pounds 
(0.385kg) (O) 
The system must be self-powered (Untethered) (T), 
use standard battery size such as AA or AAA (O) 
The volume must be less than the AN/PRC-152A 
7.6” x 2.5” x 1.6”. 











The system must ensure all sensitive data meets 
NSA Encryption standards for wireless traffic 
Encryption Standards 
The transition requires a measure of assumption and generalization but a thorough process of 
operational analysis enables extraction of technical requirements the system must accomplish. 
Measurements such as the maximum physical size are inferred by the current size, weight, and 




Success of a system replacing BFT backhaul at the TL level or enhancing current 
capabilities at the TL to connect the Soldier level rests on meeting the specified system 
technical requirements. 
C. COMBAT SUPPORT SCENARIO 
1. Potential Opportunities 
The Army presently requires an integration mechanism for managing power and 
energy on installations as well as giving Soldiers and leaders a multimedia interface 
through which to measure, manage, control, prioritize, and redistribute resources (Army 
Capabilities Integration Center–Research, Development and Engineering Command–
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, U.S. Army 2010). The white paper’s energy security goals 
show potential solution space for 6LoWPAN by reducing energy consumption and 
increasing efficiency (Army Capabilities Integration Center–Research, Development and 
Engineering Command–Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, U.S. Army 2010). As stated earlier, 
some of the current commercial uses achievable by 6LoWPAN include control of interior 
lighting, audio and video, thermostat control, or multiple monitoring systems. Industry’s 
use of 6LoWPAN technology includes remote sensor and actuator control in monitoring 
or automation processes (Toscano and Bello 2012). Army base infrastructure requires 
many, if not all, of the same functionalities. Automatic dimmer switches today connect to 
room motion sensors and save on unnecessary lighting expenses. Motion sensors beneath 
water and soap spigots reduce unnecessary waste. Automatic timer-cutoff switches 
reduce fuel or battery waste. However, motion sensor control possesses problems of 
inconsistent performance experienced by anyone attempting to wash his or her hands 
underneath one. Additionally, timer-based cutoff switches risk costly unnecessary startup 
and shutdown procedures. 
Two-way networking offers separate savings, in time and resources. Strong 
potential exists in personnel or equipment location within a defined space, or smart 
building. Thus, further applications of 6LoWPAN include processing of frustrated cargo, 
vehicle tracking, hospital patient monitoring, or equipment monitoring. Even sensitive 
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resources such as donated blood within a temperature-controlled storage room require 
near real-time data on location, temperature, and shelf-life. 
2. Stakeholder Perspective 
A stakeholder’s analysis of smart building technology provides insight to the most 
important capabilities of an operational system. Within a defined space such as a military 
hospital, equipment and patient tracking commonly occurs when an employee physically 
locates the equipment or patient through annotating last known location. A nurse keeping 
track of unused monitors of interest or patients in the infectious disease wing desires 
knowing near real-time locations of both. Attending nurses in search of doctors also 
desire knowing near real-time locations of the doctoral staff. The hospital staff in search 
of usable blood could record and automatically update inventory in near real-time. The 
hospital patients and staff demand anonymity from outside onlookers and the associated 
equipment must prevent unwanted tampering of information. Security, mobility, and 
timeliness emerge as paramount to the stakeholder. Therefore, any additional technology 
must be untethered, lightweight, capable of reporting location, and offer appropriate  
data throughput. 
3. Combat Support Scenario 
In this operational scenario, the situation includes a combat support hospital 
(CSH) staff responding to a combat related sniper wound being brought in for emergency 
treatment. The objective is to save the life and limb of the Soldier. The friendly forces 
include the hospital staff, the patients, and the visitors. Potential threats include lost time 
due to misplaced equipment or any local national personnel hired to work within the 
building desiring to disrupt operations for any reason. It is assumed each hospital staffer, 
patient, and shared equipment has a 6LoWPAN device, and integrated 802.11 routers 
capable of interfacing 802.15.4 devices cover the hospital footprint. The 6LoWPAN 
devices continually pass location and patient data throughout the field hospital.  The field 
hospital occupies a concrete shelter built by local contractors of the host country. The 
time is 1500 hours, local.  
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A MEDEVAC support team notifies the combat support hospital (CSH) they are 
inbound with a wounded Soldier and his leg is bleeding badly. All staffers dutifully 
execute assigned roles and move to assigned locations. The anesthesiologist is in the 
chow hall while the chief surgeon is resting in his bunk. Those in the emergency wing 
detect the locations of the 802.15.4 devices assigned to the needed personnel. Meanwhile, 
a nurse scans a bag of blood on a networked scanner that immediately gets transmitted 
over the network to update the inventory. The needed doctors are notified by either a 
runner knowing their positions or messaged on personal 6LoWPAN devices interfacing a 
display screen. High-value high-demand equipment is easily located using the master 
overlay. A coordinated effort, accelerated by use of 6LoWPAN, saves the Soldier’s life. 
In the days following the emergency surgery, the Soldier’s vital signs in recovery begin 
to fall. A 6LoWPAN device transmits an alarm tone to specific medical personnel based 
on threshold values dynamically set on a blood pressure monitor wirelessly connected to 
the network. The monitoring nurse immediately checks on the patient while the doctor 
adds the patient next in his queue to check. Information dynamically set by each sensor 
transmits to a database cataloging desired data. All vital and shared medical equipment 
gets tracked real-time with location and battery status. A local national and his device 
enabled cleaning equipment get noticed entering a restricted area cueing military police 
to immediately intervene. 
From this single scenario, many key aspects of the smart building data links 
become apparent. Location of personnel and assets also require precision inside ten 
meters. Additionally, the capability must geo-locate without an additional interface. 
Coupled with a static map overlay, distance and direction to items quickly gets 
determined. Hospital staffers need real-time location data on doctors, such as an 
anesthesiologist. Near real-time (NRT) position updates provide location and pattern of 
movement. Hospital staffers and equipment require a lightweight, non-obtrusive, 
untethered device containing identification consistent with their role. A very large area 
network, with high-power, long-range, and heavy-throughput capability may 
unnecessarily expend energy and resources. Data matching persons and locations in a 
non-hostile environment poses little threat to security but may warrant encryption in a 
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hostile environment. A fixed network node within a building offers opportunity for 
connection to fixed power sources. A wireless network creates vulnerability to denial of 
service attacks. A low-powered network attenuated by exterior walls emits a lessened 
footprint and reduces the risk of eavesdropping or malicious nodes even sensing a 
network. However, in this case, any nodal transmission should be less than what is 
required to pass through floors or exterior walls. Therefore, static nodes would need to be 
placed appropriately to relay information from any rooms back to a compiling system. 
The lightweight, non-obtrusive, untethered device requirement translates to battery 
operated, less than a few square inches, and weigh no more than cellular phones of today. 
Each floor could contain a single integrated router or each section of a floor could contain 
an integrated router. Topology and routing dictate power requirements at differing levels 
or roles. A compiling system with a BFT overlay, presumably viewable at each nurse’s 
workstation, enables multi-viewing and querying. Therefore, an interface must exist to a 
system networking multiple locations and capable of displaying received information to 
all users simultaneously. Any PC, laptop, or even smart phone on the market today 
possesses ample capability to receive IP based packets, glean the information contained 
therein and display on a map or multi-dimensional model executed at the application 
layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. The system must be maintainable by hospital staff 
with minimal effort. Any device carried by personnel must be highly transportable. A 
device requiring a battery change out or being below a disposable cost-point both offer 
reasonable levels of maintainability. An IP-based system easily allows IP-capable 
devices, such as smart phones, to join the larger network and participate in data exchange 
assuming a security layer exists between the external interface and the nodes. 
Incorporation of smart phones as user interfaces and user input mechanisms presumably 
ensures the highest level of adoption. Therefore, accomplishing indoor geolocation of 
personnel through means of Wi-Fi triangulation is assumed to provide sufficient 
accuracy. Implementation requires that users allow location sharing with the intended 
application on the device. Personnel without a Wi-Fi capable personal device should 
carry a dedicated 6LoWPAN device. Lastly, a system node on common equipment 
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should last at least one month, or 30 days, without requiring battery swap out. Nodes 
worn by individuals should last no fewer than 24 hours and ideally as long as 30 days. 
Compiling the operational requirements leads to a list of required functions and 
results in answering the research question of where 6LoWPAN could interface current 
support capabilities. The functions in Figure 13 accomplish maintaining near real-time 
location of all hospital resources and personnel. 
 
The functions cleanly translate into operational requirements from which technical 
requirements can be derived. 
Figure 13.  Essential Functions for Maintaining Near Real-Time Location 
of all Hospital Resources and Personnel.  
D. COMBAT SUPPORT TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 
The technical requirements of maintaining near real-time location of all hospital 
resources must trace back to the aforementioned operational requirements. Table 8 places 
performance metrics on operational requirements, quickly deriving system technical 
requirements for operational use as a smart-building equipment and personnel tracking 
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system. Success of a system enhancing NRT locating of hospital resources and personnel 
rests on meeting the specified system technical requirements. 
Table 8.   Translation of a Smart Building’s Operational Requirements 
to System Technical Requirements. 
Operational 
Requirement 






The system must geo-locate other nodes at least 20 
meters through obstructed line-of-sight (OLOS) 
equivalent to a 10-inch thick concrete wall. (Equivalent 
to 200 m LOS) 











The system must be capable of geo-locating equipment 
without use of a separate system capability to an accuracy 








The system must be capable of accepting geolocation 
from personal smartphones. 
 
Definition of Interface 








The added system weight must not exceed 0.45kg (1 
pound) (T); must not exceed 0.28kg (0.5 pounds)(O). 
Devices on personnel must last no less than 24 hours 
before battery replacement 
Devices on equipment must last no less than 30 days 
before battery replacement. 















The system must not allow uninvited nodes from joining 
network 




practices in place 
The transition requires a measure of assumption and generalization but a thorough process of 
operational analysis enables extraction of technical requirements the system must accomplish. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF 6LOWPAN FEASIBILITY 
This chapter addresses 6LoWPAN protocol performance against derived system 
requirements. In doing so, the chapter answers the research question of assessing 
feasibility for Army usage in both an operational setting and support setting. Measures of 
performance within a communication system at each setting defined in previous chapters 
lead to measures of success, or feasibility. Both scenarios provide an opportunity to 
address the research question on SWAP costs. 
A. OPERATIONAL SETTING 
In a BFT backhaul role, analyzing sufficiency for operational use, can begin at 
any point since all performance requirements (device size, range, throughput, duration, 
topology, and security) must be assessed against all others. This analysis demonstrates 
only a subset of calculations. Assessments in this chapter initially assume a star topology 
with intent to minimize size and power while meeting throughput and range 
requirements. 
1. Range 
In attempts to keep size and weight as small as possible, the device should  
be no larger than the battery size if possible. The dominant dimension of a standard  
AA battery is 5.05 centimeters (2 inches) and a standard AAA battery is 4.45 centimeters 
(1.75 inches). Antenna gain advantage (Equation 2.2) amplifies the signal on both the 
transmitting and receiving ends. Considering input parameters consistent with Table 9, 
Friis’ free space equation (Equation 2.1) is used to calculate the LOS transmission range. 
The results of these calculations fail to meet the worst-case operational requirement of 
300 meters using just 0.5 mW of transmission power, as shown in Figure 14. However, 
dipole antenna length affects the transmission power at a non-linear rate of change. The 




Table 9.   Input Parameters to Friis’ Free Space Equation  
Input Parameter Value 
Dipole Antenna Length (inches) 1.70 to 2.45 
Transmission Power (dBm) -3 
O-QPSK Frequency (MHz) 2450 
Receiver Sensitivity (dBm) (O-QPSK) -85 
Noise Factor (dB) 3 
 
 
The relationship demonstrates the effect antenna length has on range. Beyond 300 meters 
range, atmospheric attenuation reduces range at rates not reflected by the relationship. 
Figure 14.  Range Capability as a Function of Minimum Power and 
Dipole Antenna Length 
An optimized solution meets the required distance with the least amount of power 
but must balance overall device length as an additional constraint from the user. Figure 
15 shows a series of maximum range capabilities based on varying dipole antenna length 
and transmission power. Achieving 300 meters is possible by 0 dBm (1 mW) but requires 
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a dipole antenna length of at least 2.3 inches. However, decreased dipole antenna length 
directly increases transportability to the user.  
 
Observing the 300-meter requirement, lower transmission strength requires more dipole 
antenna length. At 2 inches, at least 5 dBm of Transmission power is required. ISM Band 
restrictions limit maximum output to 0 dBm. Therefore, at 0 dBm, at least 2.3 inches of 
dipole antenna length are required. 
Figure 15.  Relationship between Antenna Length, Transmission Power, and Range 
User requirements should define a maximum device dimension but be mindful of 
the direct influence on required energy. Optimizing a minimum size suggests a maximum 
dimension no larger than the required battery size. However, the minimum power able to 
reach beyond 300 meters with only -2 dBm (0.63 mW) is approximately 2.45 inches 
dipole length. 
The resultant range values use an estimated loss factor of 3 dB due to internal 
componentry. Removing this factor essentially increases the range by a multiple of 1.414, 
the square root of two. This thesis does not perform analysis on obstructed LOS, though 
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equations such as the Okamura-Hata model equations exist and can be used to determine 
radio frequency behavior for urban areas given specific input parameters. 
2. Throughput 
Only actual realized data rate determines performance. Detractors from data rate 
include headers, or overhead, at each layer discussed in Chapter II. In the best case, 
headers reduce the 127-byte message to carrying 78 bytes of payload traffic. This factor 
of actual payload versus message length results in 61.5% of the intended 250 kbps 
throughput, equating to approximately 153 kbps. In the worst case, only 35.4% of 250 
kbps transmits payload, equating to approximately 88 kbps actual realized throughput. 
Further still, CSMA-CA protocols reduce throughput as a function of distance, a factor of 
0.86 at 300 meters and 0.96 at 30 meters. Thus, resulting in a maximum realized 
throughput between 76 kbps and 132 kbps at 300 meters, and 85 kbps to 147 kbps at 30 
meters. 
Voice communications could feasibly occur with high compression rates 
performed by compressor-decompressor (codec) devices. However, this thesis does not 
measure the acceptability of voice performance, scalability effects from additional users, 
or additional power consumption a codec may draw. In any case, additional users reduce 
the amount of available throughput and additional processing requires additional power. 
3. Power and Energy 
Energy measurements are calculated based on intended throughput reduced only 
by the CSMA-CA factor since it affects transmission rates. Figure 16 uses Equation 2.5 
to display the energy expended for a device containing a dipole antenna of 2.45 inches in 
length, and transmitting a full-length message of 127 bytes to a range of 300 meters. 
Figure 16 shows the energy expended in Joules for data rates ranging from 250 kbps, the 
theoretical maximum of 2.4 GHz, at 300-meter separation using CSMA-CA protocols, to 
100 kbps, an alternate value specified in the protocol. Figure 16 also shows the energy 
expended based on varying transmission powers ranging from -5 dBm (0.316 mW) to 4 
dBm (2.5 mW). 
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Incorporating Equation 2.4, data aggregation costs further energy at a rate of 5 nJ 
per bit. Thus, full-length messages of 127 bytes cost 5080 nJ per transmission for data 
aggregation alone. Expecting a CSMA-CA throughput performance of 215 kbps at the 
maximum ISM power of 1mW (0 dBm), a full-length message expends an estimated 
4064 nJ.  Compiling both energy decrements using Equation 2.6, the total energy 
expended as a function of message length, distance, transmission power, and throughput 
is displayed in Figure 16. 
 
The data aggregation energy adds to the transmission energy for total energy expended 
based on a 300-meter range. The figure also represents a CSMA-CA factor of 0.86, and 
sending a full message length of 127 bytes plus 5 nJ/bit of aggregation. 
Figure 16.  Total Energy Expended per Message for Various Data Rates and 
Transmission Powers using CSMA-CA Protocols at 300 meters 
Thus, assuming a linear battery drain profile to simplify analysis, a fully charged 
AAA rechargeable battery discharging at 1.2 volts contains 1000 mA-hours, 4320 Joules, 
or 4320 Watt-seconds. A fully charged AA battery discharging at 1.2 volts contains 1700 
mAh, or 2040 mW-hours, or 7344 Joules. Another option is to use a disposable AA or 
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AAA battery discharging at 1.5 volts that contains even more energy. This option is a 
simple calculation difference and not investigated in this thesis. Each message, depending 
on the data rate and message length, takes a specific time to send. This transmission time 
is denoted as ttrans. Hence, combining the amount of energy expended per message, EFS, 
ttrans, and applying CSMA-CA protocols at 300 meters, the worst-case device duration 
times can be calculated. The device duration times are shown in Table 10. As a 
walkthrough example, at 250 kbps, the CSMA-CA protocols throttle the actual 
throughput down by a factor of 0.86 at 300 meters to 215 kbps. A 127-byte message 
equates to 1016 bits and dividing the length by rate computes ttrans in seconds per 
message. The total Watts expended per message, as calculated in Equation 2.6, vary by 
transmission power, message length, processing power assumption, and bit rate. The 
duration of a device varies by energy source size. Table 10 only highlights the results for 




Table 10.   Device Duration (High-Low limits, -2 dBm and 0 dBm) by Data Rate in Continuous Operation 









































100 86 30 to 53 0.0102 1.3E-05 1.7E-05 0.56 0.48 0.73 0.63 
115 98.9 35 to 61 0.0088 1.2E-05 1.5E-05 0.58 0.51 0.76 0.66 
130 111.8 39 to 69 0.0078 1.1E-05 1.4E-05 0.60 0.53 0.79 0.69 
145 124.7 44 to 77 0.0070 1.0E-05 1.3E-05 0.62 0.55 0.81 0.71 
160 137.6 48 to 85 0.0064 9.7E-06 1.2E-05 0.64 0.56 0.83 0.73 
175 150.5 53 to 93 0.0058 9.3E-06 1.2E-05 0.65 0.58 0.85 0.75 
190 163.4 58 to 101 0.0053 9.0E-06 1.1E-05 0.66 0.59 0.86 0.77 
205 176.3 62 to 109 0.0050 8.7E-06 1.1E-05 0.67 0.60 0.88 0.79 
220 189.2 67 to 117 0.0046 8.5E-06 1.0E-05 0.68 0.61 0.89 0.80 
235 202.1 71 to 125 0.0043 8.3E-06 1.0E-05 0.69 0.62 0.90 0.81 
250 215 76 to 132 0.0041 8.1E-06 9.8E-06 0.70 0.63 0.91 0.83 
This table depicts expected device duration of various data rates transmitting full-length messages for a six-member fire team. It also assumes 5 
nJ/bit for processing. 
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Assuming constant transmission and data aggregation at an actual rate of 215 
kbps based on 250 kbps transmitted for a star topology, and -2 dBm (0.63 mW) output 
power, a 6LoWPAN device using an AA battery would last no less than 0.91 hours, or 55 
minutes. Similarly, using an AAA power source with identical inputs allows continuous 
operations for no less than 0.70 hours, or 42 minutes. A sensitivity analysis on data 
aggregation energy shows that doubling the required power to 10nJ/message reduces the 
expected lifetime of the same parameters of an AA powered device to last approximately 
43 minutes, and AAA powered devices to last approximately 33 minutes.  
Constant transmissions, however, may not be necessary per the requirement that 
data position updates occur only once every 10 seconds. This requirement updates the 
message per hour rate to 360 messages per hour, far less than 762,000 messages per hour 
used for continuous transmissions. Therefore, the anticipated device duration at 300 
meters, transmitting at -2 dBm once every 10 seconds, and using CSMA-CA protocols 
lasts 26.5 hours (AA Battery) or 20.3 hours (AAA Battery).  
4. Topology 
The data presented thus far describe a star network performance. However, mesh 
topologies can be supported for a team size element must take three or fewer hops to 
support requirements A.2 and A.3. Considering each retransmitted message requires the 
same amount of energy as an original message, a team member acting as a cluster head 
should expect to pass traffic from additional nodes at a rate equal to the overall team size, 
n, plus his or her own every ten seconds, as shown in Figure 17. Similarly, nodes closest 
to a cluster node should nominally expect to pass traffic from additional nodes, at a rate 
half the size of the team, n/2 times as often also shown in Figure 17.  Obviously, nodes 
serving in a cluster head role require additional energy sources.  
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The number of messages a meshed device should expect to pass depends on the team or 
squad position. The closest in, or orange, team member (surrounded by the dotted line 
box), setup by this specific routing configuration should expect to pass 3 messages 
(shown in blue, orange, and green to highlight separate messages) every 10 seconds. 
Figure 17.  The Number of Messages Any Device Should Expect to Pass  
Therefore, a node operating as a team member node should nominally expect to 
pass three times the amount of messages every 10 seconds in a six member team. 
Additionally, scaling to a mesh network practically precludes voice traffic already on the 
minimum edge of acceptability in a point-to-point configuration. Table 11 displays the 




Table 11.   Team Member Device Duration (High-Low limits, -2 dBm and 0 dBm) by Data Rate given  























































100 86 30 to 53 0.0102 1.0E-05 1.7E-05 9.42 8.11 12.28 10.57 
115 98.9 35 to 61 0.0088 9.5E-06 1.5E-05 9.80 8.51 12.78 11.09 
130 111.8 39 to 69 0.0078 9.0E-06 1.4E-05 10.14 8.86 13.22 11.55 
145 124.7 44 to 77 0.0070 8.6E-06 1.3E-05 10.43 9.17 13.59 11.95 
160 137.6 48 to 85 0.0064 8.3E-06 1.2E-05 10.68 9.44 13.93 12.31 
175 150.5 53 to 93 0.0058 8.0E-06 1.2E-05 10.91 9.69 14.22 12.64 
190 163.4 58 to 101 0.0053 7.8E-06 1.1E-05 11.11 9.92 14.48 12.93 
205 176.3 62 to 109 0.0050 7.6E-06 1.1E-05 11.29 10.12 14.72 13.20 
220 189.2 67 to 117 0.0046 7.4E-06 1.0E-05 11.45 10.31 14.94 13.44 
235 202.1 71 to 125 0.0043 7.2E-06 1.0E-05 11.60 10.48 15.13 13.67 
250 215 76 to 132 0.0041 7.1E-06 9.8E-06 11.74 10.64 15.31 13.88 
This table depicts expected device duration of various data rates transmitting full-length messages for a six-member fire team with each team 
member only sending traffic once every 10 seconds. It also assumes 5 nJ/bit for processing. 
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In a mesh topology, if each device attempts transmission only once every 10 
seconds and assuming 85 kbps realized throughput based on 250 kbps transmitted, and -2 
dBm (0.63 mW) output power, a 6LoWPAN device using an AA battery would last no 
less than 15.3 hours. Similarly, using an AAA power source with identical inputs allows 
operations for no less than 11.7 hours. Further, if only position data (15 bytes) gets 
transmitted, an AA battery lasts over 17.5 hours and an AAA battery lasts over 13.4 
hours. 
The addition of a second battery simply doubles the lifetime, but adds associated 
weight. Though frequency and spectrum management may limit transmission power, 
antenna length for additional gain most directly maintains range at lesser transmission 
power. 
5. Security 
The NIST allows sending SBU information over an AES-CCM-128 network. All 
estimates of throughput, energy, and duration anticipate a byte requirement consistent 
with AES-CCM-256. Authorizing traffic at the appropriate level to transmit SBU saves 
18 bytes per message, or 144 bits per message. The savings of 18 bytes can be realized by 
increased payload space, resulting in increased throughput. Therefore, the shorter 
messages directly reduce energy consumption and increase device longevity. 
A star topology may fit current Infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs) of being within LOS of the Team Leader. Making the team leader (TL) a cluster 
head, the network devices search only for one target. Because the network is mobile and 
low power, the likelihood is lessened that an adversary could capture any payload data, or 
even affect the header data (that is unencrypted), thus negating the need for any further 
security in this area. 
Overall, network architecture limited only by IPv6, determines routing and hop 
count conditions. A route-over or mesh-under configuration determines necessary levels 
of security. The assumptions made in this analysis used worst-case values to ensure 
appropriate consideration of feasibility.  
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The military’s DOD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation 
Process (DIACAP) must assess the network architecture. This thesis assumes firewall 
functionality exists at the interface between 6LoWPAN devices and the larger network to 
allow less than AES-CCM-256 encryption. 
6. Geolocation 
Geolocation in a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) requires data rates outside of 
the capability of this protocol. In a best-case scenario, attempting to triangulate location 
requires at least three additional stationary nodes. The nodes required to be stationary 
must self-report as stationary. This functionality requires additional programming to the 
processor, also requiring additional energy drain outside the scope of this thesis. This 
thesis assumes an interface to an external GPS device such as the DAGR, weighing one 
pound with battery. 
B. SUPPORT SETTING 
Applying the same process for analyzing sufficiency to a support setting 
demonstrates the robustness of the model. The same model process measures feasibility 
of 6LoWPAN for secure Army use in a general support setting. 
1. Range 
Much closer range requirements exist within a combat support hospital. Often thin 
tent walls do little to attenuate signals at such close distances but employment within an 
occupied concrete structure could significantly alter the expected range of performance 
and act as a worst-case figure. Internal building attenuation of a 10-inch concrete wall, 
not uncommon in desert-area construction, of 10 dB nominally equates to a range 
reduction of one-tenth. Therefore, a requirement of 20 meters OLOS equates to ranging 
200 meters LOS. Referring back to Figure 15, a 2.1 inch dipole antenna ranges 200 
meters LOS at 0 dBm (1 mW) and a 2.2 inch dipole antenna ranges 200 meters LOS at -2 
dBm (0.63 mW).  
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2. Throughput 
Throughput remains consistent between both models employing CSMA-CA and 
header options. Reduction in message sizes, fewer nodes, and closer ranges increase 
throughput. 
3. Power and Energy 
Power and energy calculation methods remain consistent between both models 
but the requirement for the number of messages per unit time differs. Requirements for 
equipment updates within a facility differ depending on the relative importance of the 
piece. Assuming a position update frequency every 10 minutes, a lower range 
requirement, and potential for shorter message lengths, the battery life extends well 
beyond the BFT use. Table 12 shows an abbreviated version of expected device duration 
at varying data rates, 5 nJ/bit of data aggregation, suggested upper and lower 





Table 12.   Item Tracker Device Duration (High-Low Transmission Powers, dBm) by Data Rate given  























































100 92 30 to 53 0.0078 9.6E-06 1.3E-05 169 147 233 206 
175 161 52 to 93 0.0044 7.1E-06 9.0E-06 192 173 262 239 
250 230 76 to 132 0.0031 6.2E-06 7.5E-06 205 188 277 257 
This table depicts expected device duration of various data rates transmitting position-length only messages. Position messages only require 15 
bytes of payload data as opposed to the 45-87 available bytes of full-length messages. The CSMA-CA rate estimated logarithmically between 
0.86 (300m) and 0.96 (30m) to be 0.92 (200m) 
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Further observation of Table 12 reveals the duration of devices meet a 
requirement to last beyond seven days (168 hours) at -2 dBm. Coupled with a battery 
charger, assuming ideal battery performance, a long-term expectation of devices lasting 
at least one week is reasonable. Batteries could alternate weeks of use and re-charging in-
between. To range 200 meters at -2 dBm, the device length must be at least 2.2 inches. 
4. Topology 
The scenario assumes a star topology requiring integrated access points capable of 
translating 802.15.4 protocol into 802.11x backhaul. Otherwise, a meshed network 
increases power demand on nodes closest to the access points as discussed in the prior 
topology analysis. 
5. Security 
Comprehensive security analysis depends on network configuration. As discussed 
earlier, the ability of nodes to enter and exit the network affects available levels of 
security. The requirement specifies a closed architecture, equating to a sub-router 
topology. Should a requirement arise to begin accepting out-of-network nodes, dedicated 
access points with firewall capabilities must filter traffic and process the nodes in a 
segregated manner until a network administrator adds the verified MAC address to an 
allowed address list. 
6. Geolocation 
Geolocation requires at least three stationary nodes that sense and report from a 
stationary standpoint. Feasibly, 802.11x access points or integrated routers could 
triangulate on a fourth node.  However, if any node attempting to geo-locate is moving, 
measurement accuracy suffers. Lastly, processing time and power effects due to 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the steps used to evaluate 6LoWPAN against presumed 
user requirements and demonstrates how the same model can assess similar capabilities, 
or protocols, against similar requirements. Metrics used include throughput (bits per 
second), transmission power, receiver sensitivity power, antenna gain effects, internal 
noise factor, as well as size and weight. Associated monetary costs remain for follow on 
research. Finally, the model process used should prove applicable to similar 
communication-based requirements. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Desirability of 6LoWPAN comes from the just-enough power draw to accomplish 
a necessary mission resulting in significant savings on power and energy costs. 
6LoWPAN also allows for interconnecting “things” at very little additional weight. 
Limitations of 6LoWPAN primarily include low throughput and short range. This thesis 
placed 6LoWPAN at the individual Soldier and possibly team or squad leader level in an 
operational setting leaving heavier backhaul capability to larger and more robust 
communications protocols. In an operational setting that often operates in a more static 
nature, 6LoWPAN interconnects “things” to any router access point. 6LoWPAN’s 
security readily accepts AES-CCM-128 encryption, strong enough for the NIST to 
authorize transportation of SBU information. Security options available to 6LoWPAN 
include AES-CCM-128 encryption and though the specification does not discuss AES-
CCM-256 encryption, it may be possible but requires additional testing. Security 
mechanisms most important to the Army depend on specific requirements. In the two 
associated scenarios, network topology affects energy and throughput values but does not 
affect attack resistance strength. Routing protocols and whether or not devices are 
dynamically or statically assigned affect resistance strength to the most common threats. 
Pre-assigned device, or node, addresses prevent most attacks involving malicious nodes. 
Operational employment of 6LoWPAN easily supports position and other small message 
size transmissions at sufficient ranges below the squad level. Functionality including 
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touch screen capabilities requires interfacing an external capability with additional 
processing and power. Employment of 6LoWPAN in a support setting shows strong 
potential for interconnecting any “thing” worthy of joining the larger network. 
Maximizing performance requires tradeoffs between range, device duration, and 
overhead. Throughput, security, routing options, and protocols all affect overhead 
amounts, or header length. Using 6LoWPAN devices to accomplish current functionality 
saves size and weight but sacrifices robustness of larger mission sets in different settings. 
Comparison against requirements established by the user community must ultimately 
determine sufficiency and feasibility of 6LoWPAN and whether or not the capability is 
worth acquiring. The notably small size, weight, and power of 6LoWPAN address the 
research question of whether or not 6LoWPAN and its usage against similar 
communication-based requirements merit additional exploration for the Army, and other 
services. This thesis demonstrates a method of evaluating feasibility of performance and 
security for use. 
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis covers a large amount of surface level assessment using various 
assumptions. Areas for future research include opportunities to refine the findings with 
empirical data or refined effects estimates. Additional areas of future research include 
application of the model to other communications-based requirements. 
The first area of future research involves a deeper look at power drain given 
expected parameters facing 6LoWPAN operation. OLOS signal attenuation effects from 
various construction materials in the 802.15.4 range of operation could potentially couple 
with meshed networking to reboost signal strength but actual performance should be 
researched further. Urban and suburban multipath effects could be captured by Okamura-
Hata empirical equations in anticipated usage environments to better estimate actual 
performance without empirical data from specific environments. Similarly, resiliency 
against additional threats may require increased security. However, increased security 
inevitably decreases available payload space for throughput or possibly more power 
consumption.  
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A second large area of future research includes detailed investigation of 
6LoWPAN interfaces with existing or necessary capability. In this thesis, 6LoWPAN 
interfaces integrated access point routers. Any translation between protocols likely causes 
some amount of throughput and possibly latency degradation. A detailed study of the 
effects provides better fidelity to expected performance. Additionally, 6LoWPAN 
interfaces Nett Warrior. Nett Warrior offers capabilities far beyond 6LoWPAN alone. 
6LoWPAN accomplishes what the SRW of the AN/PRC-152 accomplishes. The SRW 
SWAP characteristics of the handheld radio cannot be directly compared to 6LoWPAN, 
thus the additional capabilities of the AN/PRC-152, an already procured solution, could 
be compared. Other services without an already procured material solution, such as the 
United States Marine Corps, may gain from additional research in this area. Also, 
6LoWPAN must interface a geo-positioning device such as the Army’s DAGR. 
Therefore, additional research on the accuracy of 6LoWPAN geo-locating capabilities 
and associated overhead may render an external geo-positioning device unnecessary. 
The amount of data aggregation power exchanged between interfaced devices also 
needs to be measured. For instance, a selectively capable smart phone device possesses 
processing power, screen displays, touch screen capabilities, and on-board storage 
capacity. Such a device similar to Nett Warrior’s display device, may offer potential for 
similar functionality to Nett Warrior while benefitting from smaller size and weight. The 
duration capability of such a device to be commensurate with 6LoWPAN devices 
provides opportunity for future research. The resultant research could more appropriately 
compare 6LoWPAN with Nett Warrior at varying levels of employment. As observed in 
Figure 17, increasingly higher levels of command require significantly higher energy 
sources. Additionally, topology and routing impact energy source requirements. For 
instance, a squad configured into one single mesh may require a more distributed energy 
load balance below the squad leader, who in turn, would require a significantly higher 
energy source. Near-term research could determine power requirements at each level of 
the command given different network configurations set to match varying tactical 
configurations. Research is also necessary to determine whether or not on-board cache 
memory makes message disaggregation and re-aggregation at the physical layer sufficient 
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for required uses. This could allow larger messages with reasonable assurance of receipt 
by intended destination. 
A third area of future research exists in material enhancements. Enhanced 
material densities of batteries offer longer durations at lighter weights. Increasingly 
smaller microprocessors and flash-memory devices offer smaller and lighter device 
dimensions thereby increasing the relative advantage over available capabilities. 
Additionally, antenna gain properties in this thesis assumed a worst-case dipole antenna. 
The dipole equation used typically applies to infinitesimally small antennas but other 
equations defining antenna gain differently or for different antenna patterns directly 
affect power and energy.  
A fourth area of potential research lies in confirming all remaining assumptions 
made in this model. Confirming 5 nJ/bit for data aggregation requires empirical data that 
could potentially uncover further dependent variables. This research could also affect the 
research pertaining to 6LoWPAN interfaces. This thesis chose 1.2V rechargeable NiMH 
batteries for analysis. Other applications could require disposable batteries depending on 
transportability requirements. Such batteries typically discharge at a nominal 1.5 volts. 
Additionally, batteries draining at non-linear rates could affect analysis in ways 
warranting research. 
A fifth area of research could encapsulate sufficiency from a user perspective 
given resultant throughput. Voice quality at rates less than 100 kbps requiring codec 
capabilities should be measured against subjectively defined acceptability. Similarly, 
future research could determine sufficiency of data messaging at maximum remaining 
payload in other applications. 
A final area of potential research opportunities exists in applying the same model 
to different applications. Research could determine the suitability of this approach to 
model similar measures of performance and methods of measure applied to similar 
communication-based systems. 
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